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ABSTRACT 
  It is widely accepted that in order to improve the economic position of the EU relative to the 
USA certain structural reforms need to be undertaken, mainly in the labour market. However few 
EU countries have undertaken such reforms. The reason lies in the fact that those reforms are 
going to be costly in terms of economic performance, unemployment and hence the cost of 
financing them - at least in the short term. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a model based 
on imperfect competition in both product and labour markets in order to show the impact of 
deregulation on the economy. However they do not consider the question of how to finance such 
reforms or overcome the short run costs, a key consideration if the short run costs are large 
relative to the long run gains. We extend their model by including the effects of another inevitable 
source of imperfections: distortionary taxation - not only the most likely candidate for reform, but 
also the most likely instrument for financing the restructuring process. By extending the model in 
this way we can establish formally that reforms imply significant short run costs as well as long run 
gains; that (political opposition apart) the financing of such reforms will be the main stumbling 
block. We come to a number of conclusions which reverse the Blanchard and Giavazzi results; and 
find that, in addition, the composition of the reform package matters, as does the distribution of 
the tax burden. This model therefore supplies new results on the design and sequencing of 
reforms.  
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Product market regulation and labour market rigidities are widely blamed
for the poor economic performance in Europe. As a result, structural re-
form has become the leading economic policy issue in the Eurozone. It
has been argued from the start that such reforms are an essential prereq-
uisite for a successful monetary union (Delors, 1989). Moreover, since the
European Economies appear to be less reformed and less ￿ exible than their
American counterparts, e⁄orts to restore economic performance vis-a-vis the
US economy have been associated, in particular, with the need for higher
productivity, lower costs and more ￿ exible (or more competitive) labour
markets.
These arguments have been made, and widely supported, by policy mak-
ers and analysts alike under the heading of the Lisbon agenda (Sapir, 2004).
The remarkable fact is that, despite structural reforms having been dis-
cussed and advocated so widely (and in many cases as a matter of urgency),
they have seldom been carried out in practice. And where they have been
attempted, it has often been as a piecemeal e⁄ort, partial in its scope and
quickly abandoned in the face of opposition. Agenda 2010 (Hartz IV) in
Germany, labour market deregulation and liberalization (especially in ser-
vices) in France, reconstructing social security in Italy, or the Lisbon process
in general, are just four such examples.
Much of this debate has come to focus speci￿cally on reforms in the
labour market. That, it seems, is based on the analytic and empirical evi-
dence of a negative link between economic performance and wage rigidities
in many countries (Bruno, 1986). That link has certainly been observed in
the labour and product markets of Europe (Koedijk and Kremers, 1996),
where performance is measured in rates of growth and employment; and
deregulation in competition policy, merger codes and the liberalization of
employment practices. The result has been high production costs, espe-
cially in non-wage costs; high and persistent unemployment; and sluggish
growth without falling costs or in￿ ation. So, while there is little disagree-
ment that performance and market reforms are related, the nature of their
relationship is not well understood. For example, Delors (1989) argues that
market ￿ exibility is necessary for good performance in a currency union, but
views economic structures as exogenous and changeable only through speci￿c
policies carried out by nation states. Others, e.g. Frankel and Rose (1998),
argue that economic structures may be endogenous. If so, the case for re-
form is less obvious. It may materialize as a consequence of ￿globalization￿
anyway. In that spirit, Andersen et al (2000) have found that monetary uni-
￿cation in Europe is changing labour market structures and inducing wage
cost convergence, but only in a small way. By contrast, Calmfors (1998,
2001) suggests that, although money wage ￿ exibility may increase inside
2EMU, labour market reform is less likely there since monetary uni￿cation
was seen to be a vehicle for removing time inconsistencies in government poli-
cies. Now that this has happened, the incentive to reform falls away. Sibert
(1999) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000) argue that asymmetric shocks will
modify this conclusion since countries still have an incentive to adopt mea-
sures (mainly wage-cost ￿ exibility) against such shocks to replace exchange
rate adjustments. But that means that, where some countries have above
average distortions, others will face an incentive to allow similar distortions
or rigidities rather than accept the short run costs/performance losses that
would ensue when they have to do the adjusting.
In this paper, we use a standard model of wage bargaining with imperfect
competition in the product markets and di⁄erent forms of distortionary tax-
ation in order to understand the likely incentives for, and eventual outcomes
of, structural reform programmes. We use the results to explain policy mak-
ers￿behaviour and draw certain conclusions about the design and sequencing
of reform packages.
We examine three speci￿c propositions. First, we examine the proposi-
tion that structural reforms may be hindered by the fact that they involve
large costs or performance losses up front, and typically only bring bene-
￿ts in the longer term. Politically sensitive policy makers, and those with
high discount factors, may worry that the short term costs will outweigh the
long term bene￿ts ￿especially if the latter are uncertain. Second, we ask
if there is a link between the need for ￿scal discipline and the di¢ culty of
undertaking structural reforms, which could lead to those reforms not being
undertaken. Third, we examine whether the composition of the reform pack-
age matters. Speci￿cally whether the distribution of the tax burden matters;
whether taxes on earnings (incentives) matter more than payroll/corporate
taxes (costs) in the reform process; and whether the degree of wage bargain-
ing power or product market liberalization matters more than either.1
2 The Model
In order to consider the various e⁄ect of the tax system on wage bargain-
ing behaviour, and thereby to identify the set of possible implications for
1These three propositions should sound familiar, although little work has been done
on them. Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003) ￿nd a similar pattern of a lack of incentive
for reform in a model with monopolistic labour unions. Dellas and Tavlas (2005) ￿nd
the same, but without detail on how wages and prices are formed. HM Treasury (2003)
￿nd it again in their numerical simulations of market ￿ exibility in their tests for UK
membership of EMU; as do Hughes Hallett et al (2004, 2005). But no-one has managed
to analyse formally why these results emerge. Are they due to short run costs vs. long run
bene￿ts, or ￿scal con￿ icts that delay the process? Or do they arise because the burden of
adjustment has been badly distributed between incentives and costs, between labour and
capital, or between the labour market (the social market model) and the product markets
(the anglo-saxon approach)? To answer that is our contribution.
3reform, we extend Blanchard and Giavazzi￿ s (2003) framework by introduc-
ing distortionary taxation into the economy. Together with distortionary
taxes, there are two other deviations from the perfect competition which
are necessary in order to generate the rationale for both product and labour
market reforms. The ￿rst one arises from the assumption of the imperfectly
competitive product markets. In this case we assume the presence of certain
number of the monopolistically competitive ￿rms each of them producing
di⁄erentiated good. Then, on the labour market side we introduce an im-
perfection by assuming a formal wage bargaining process between ￿rms and
their workers.
The presence of the monopolistically competitive ￿rms leads to the cre-
ation of rents in the economy, the size of which is determined by the degree
of monopolistic competition. At the same time, the existence of a wage
bargaining process leads to a certain distribution of those rents between the
￿rms and the workers. Distortionary taxation is necessary to realistically
complete the story since any reform that is going to be undertaken somehow
needs to be ￿nanced.
We will not explicitly model the dynamics in this paper but in order
to allow for di⁄erence in the e⁄ects over time we will follow Blanchard and
Giavazzi by imposing a clear cut di⁄erence between the short term and the
long term. This is achieved by ￿xing the number of producers in the market
exogenously in the short run, whereas in the long run we allow that number
to be determined endogenously by a market entry condition determined
solely by a per unit entry cost . One can think of this entry cost as being
approximation for certain regulatory or administrative entry barriers present
in the product markets. Although there would be no substantial di⁄erence
in the equilibrium outcomes if this cost were treated as a shadow cost, it
is better to think of it as real cost which is proportional to output. The
reason is that by assuming this cost to be a shadow cost, it means that
￿rms present in the market would only be able to earn pure pro￿ts in the
long run, whereas in the case of the real cost assumption these pro￿ts would
be dissipated in the entry cost. But in order to perform any numerical
analysis these costs would need to be treated as real, and may be thought
as the cost of the time needed to satisfy all of the regulatory requirements
plus the o¢ cial cost necessary to set the ￿rm up and licence it as a legal
entity.
2.1 The Consumers problem
More precisely we assume that economy is populated by the ￿xed number of
workers-consumers L indexed by j, who can choose either to work or not to
work and be unemployed. If the worker decides to work he must supply one
unit of labour. In other words, we are assuming that labour is indivisible.
4The utility function for worker j is given by following expression
Uj=
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￿
i;j
! ￿
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(1)
where Ci;j represents individual j￿ s consumption of the i-th product; m
represents number of ￿rms or products present in the market ; and ￿ stands
for elasticity of substitution between products (￿rms) which is de￿ned as ￿ =
￿f(m): We assume that this elasticity of substitution is increasing function
of the number of products, where f0(m) > 0 and that ￿ may be ￿xed by
policy. That is crucial for disentangling the di⁄erence between the short and
the long run since, by imposing an exogenous number of ￿rms present in
the market, it implies that the elasticity of substitution will be constant and
exogenous in the short term. But in the long run it will be endogenous and
determined by the number of products or ￿rms that emerge in the long run
market equilibrium.
As pointed out in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) this speci￿cation of
utility has two important features. First, assuming all the workers are iden-
tical, the utility of the workers will not depend directly on the number of
products, but on the level of aggregate consumption instead. Second, an
increase in the number of products increases the elasticity of consumption
between them and thereby reduces monopoly power of the individual pro-
ducer. That might have indirect consequences on the utility of the individual
worker.
When making consumption decisions, each worker maximises (1) subject
to the following budget constraint:
m X
i=1
PiCi;j = (1 ￿ tw)wjNj + Pwr(u)[1 ￿ Nj] (2)
where Nj takes the value of one if the worker j chooses to work or zero if
he or she is unemployed. wr(u) can be interpreted as the unemployment
bene￿t received from government in the case of unemployment, or equiva-
lently the worker￿ s reservation wage. We assume that this social support,
unemployment bene￿t or reservation wage is a decreasing function of the
unemployment rate in the economy as a whole: w0
r(u) < 0. This assumption
is reasonable since the higher the unemployment rate in the economy, the
higher the pressure on the government to ￿nance those bene￿ts; or equiv-
alently the higher the unemployment the more willing are the workers to
accept lower wage and hence a lower reservation wage. tw represents a wage
tax paid by all employees; it is explained in more detail in section 2.3. Fi-
nally, P stands for the price aggregator obtained after solving consumer￿ s
optimization problem.
5It is given by:
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This expression is slightly di⁄erent from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz ag-
gregator as consequence of the assumed form of the utility function at (1).
Solving the consumer￿ s optimization problem, and using the fact that the
problem is symmetric across all consumers, we obtain an expression for the
wage that would maximise utility for the individual consumer.
It is given by
h
(1 ￿ tw)
wj
P
￿ wr(u)
i
Nj + wr(u) (4)
2.2 The Firms problem
We assume that each ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated product indexed by i
using the same production technology which is linear in labour. Output is
therefore given by 2
Yi = Ni (5)
Since both individual and aggregate demands are determined by the
consumer￿ s optimization problem, the ￿rms￿problem consists of determining
the prices taking demand as given. This allows us to obtain the solution for
the partial equilibrium demand function in each product market. It is given
by:
Yi =
Y
m
(
Pi
P
)￿￿ (6)
2.3 The Wage Bargaining problem and Governments
Before describing wage bargaining problem, we need to introduce several as-
sumptions regarding the tax system. First we will assume that both workers
and producers are obliged to pay certain taxes. Workers need to pay a tax
on the wages they earn. In our model, it is assumed that an average tax
rate will be imposed on every working worker￿ s wage. We also assume that
unemployment bene￿ts are not taxed. Next, producers need to pay payroll
taxes3 de￿ned as certain ￿xed percentage of the workers gross wage. Both of
2Alternatively one can think of ￿xed coe¢ cient production technology in which capital
requirement is assumed to be ￿xed and normalized to one. Another version of our results,
starting from a Cobb-Douglas function, is available and is set out in an appendix to this
paper. But the ￿nal results don￿ t change.
3Or hiring and ￿ring costs, or any other corporate taxes that vary with production
cost.
6these taxes are assumed to be ￿ at taxes, which might reduce reality of our
analysis. But it allows tractability of the model. Extensions to a progres-
sive tax system are possible, but lead to extremely complicated expressions
which e⁄ectively deny us any insight into the scope for reform. Our ￿ at tax
speci￿cation meanwhile leads to following government budget constraint
B = (tw + tp)wj ￿ Pwr(u)[1 ￿ Nj] (7)
where B represents an exogenously imposed ceiling on government debt.
For the purposes of this paper, we will treat B as constrained so that any
increases in expenditures, or reductions in taxes, must be matched by in-
creases in tax revenues elsewhere in the system. This is a device which
allows us to focus on the cost of ￿nancing any reforms. On the other hand,
de￿cits do have to be ￿nanced by interest payments or tax revenues so B
will be limited in practice.
Meanwhile each ￿rm bargains with L
m workers over wage and employment
in that industry, in both the short and long run. Intuitively this can be
thought of as the situations in which a fraction, L
m, of the workers form a
union. That union then bargains with the ￿rm over wages and the level
of employment. Indivisibility of labour implies that workers can either be
employed in the ￿rm or be unemployed.
In what follows we will consider a world of Nash e¢ cient bargaining
solutions. There are two reasons for this. First, the e¢ cient bargaining
concept allows wages to be bargained o⁄ the labour demand curve, which
implies that an increase in wages could be achieved without an immediate
decrease in employment. And secondly, some empirical studies (Dobbelaere,
2004) have rejected The Right to Manage Model in favour of an e¢ cient
bargaining model as the appropriate explanation of wage bargaining in many
European countries. Since the case for structural reform is particularly acute
in Europe, it is important to have a model that captures that feature.
Assuming risk neutrality on the part of the unions, the bargaining prob-
lem can now be written as
max
wi;Ni
f￿ log[(1 ￿ tw)wi ￿ Pwr(u)]Ni + (1 ￿ ￿)log[Pi ￿ (1 + tp)wi]Nig (8)
where ￿ represents exogenously determined index of union bargaining power;
and tw and tp represent the tax rates paid by employees and employers
respectively (0 ￿ tw;tp < 1). This formulation implies that unions want to
maximize the net wage surplus from employment represented by the ￿rst
term within the brackets, whereas ￿rms want to maximize their net pro￿t
represented by the second term.
This setup allow us to identify several important consequences of market
regulation. On the product market side we have c (entry cost) and ￿ (the
7degree of market regulation preferred by the government). Reduction in the
entry cost c can be thought as removal of some administratively imposed
restrictions or protections; or simply as replacement of some state owned
monopolies by market ￿rms. The degree of product substitutability (com-
petition) in the markets is broken into two parts: a policy component
￿
￿
￿
whose increase could represent some market liberalisation measure, or the
deregulation of some market practice, or a reduction in some trade barrier
(domestically or externally) which has the e⁄ect of increasing product sub-
stitutability. These are all matters that lie under direct government control.
The second component f(m) is an index of market competition which in-
creases with the number of products (￿rms). Implicitly, if we change ￿ by
policy, we change ￿. But m may then change as well. So, in practice we
speak of making a net change to ￿.
Finally, on the labour market side we have ￿ representing bargaining
power whose increase can be interpreted as the increase in the degree of
workers power over wage and employment decisions ranging from rights to
strike, employment protection legislation, severance conditions, ￿ring costs,
or other collective agreements. In addition both types of taxes represent reg-
ulatory instruments under direct government control, whose presence in the
economy may have a decisive in￿ uence over how structural reforms should
be conducted.
3 Solving for equilibrium outcomes
In order to solve the model we proceed in three steps. First we solve for the
short run partial equilibrium values for relative prices and real wages. These
will be used to obtain the short run general equilibrium prices and wages.
After obtaining those solutions we proceed by solving for the corresponding
long run equilibrium values.
3.1 Short run partial equilibrium relations
Equilibrium demand for each product, and hence employment will be de-
termined by (6). Since workers and ￿rms bargain over both wages and
employment, and since employment is already determined as a function of
output, our bargaining problem can be rewritten by substituting (6) into
(8) and allowing workers and ￿rms to bargain over wages and prices.
First order conditions for relative prices and real wages are respectively
given by
Pi
P
=
￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ 1
￿(1 + tp)
￿
wr(u) (9)
8and
wi
P
=
￿
￿
1 + tp
￿
Pi
P
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ tw
￿
wr(u) (10)
Using the expressions above, we can solve for short run partial equilib-
rium real wages and relative prices as functions of regulatory parameters in
the model. In fact we can now write:
Pi
P
= [1 + ￿]wr(u) (11)
and
wi
P
=
￿
1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ tw) ￿ ￿(tw + tp) + tp
(1 + tp)(1 ￿ tw)
￿
wr(u) (12)
where ￿ represents a relative price mark-up in a broad sense, de￿ned here
as
￿ =
￿(tw + tp)
(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ tw)
+
1
￿ ￿ 1
(13)
It is easy to show that this mark-up is increasing function of both taxes
on wages paid by employees, and the payroll tax paid by employers, when
￿ > 1. That is
@￿
@tp
;
@￿
@tw
> 0 (14)
when ￿ > 1, but decreasingly so as the degree of substitutability increases.4
This result is to be expected, since it is intuitive that in the case of payroll tax
increases it is optimal for producers to bargain for higher prices; whereas in
the case of an increase in the taxes paid by employees, the latter will require
higher wages (both are increasing functions of ￿). However this requirement
would lead producers to require an even higher mark-up in order for pro￿ts
not to change by too much ￿their ability to do so being limited by the
degree of inter-product substitutability.
These results show that ￿ represents a mark-up in relative prices, re￿ ect-
ing the combined rents to the ￿rm and derived rents to the work force. ￿
may therefore be negative if relative prices are below average for good i. In
fact ￿ >
(tw+tp)
(1￿tw) , for ￿ > 1; and it is a decreasing function of ￿ which reaches
4This follows from
@￿
@tp =
￿
(￿￿1)(1￿tw) and
@￿
@tw =
￿(1+tp)
(￿￿1)(1￿tw)2, with the implication
that the inequalities in (14) will be reversed if ￿ < 1.
9its minimum value at as ￿ ! 1 (a minimum that increases with tp and tw ).
Hence we can think of ￿￿
(tw+tp)
(1￿tw) as the degree of market distortion due to
imperfect competition; and
(tw+tp)
(1￿tw) as the associated degree of tax distortion
due to the tax regime. There will therefore always be some distortions, even
under perfect competition, so long as there are taxes.
Evidently, ￿ < 0 is also possible when ￿ < 1 and the degree of inter-good
substitutability is very low. In fact, a temporary mark-down on irreducible
input costs is not so unlikely if ￿rms are tied (by sunk costs, and limited
adjustment or substitution possibilities) to selling into markets where the
degree of inter-good substitution is rather limited. That is a situation which
might persist for a time, although actual wages will not be as low as the
reservation wage if labour￿ s bargaining power (￿) is not so high as to cause
mass layo⁄s. But it is clearly an unsustainable situation. Firms will either
go out of business if they cannot cover their costs; or restructure and enter
new markets for goods that are more easily substitutable for those produced
elsewhere. And as that happens, the average level of substitutability, ￿, will
necessarily rise. The mechanism is that ￿rms exiting the market reduces
m and hence ￿. That raises ￿, and hence the costs (rents) that ￿rms are
willing to pay in order to enter the market. New ￿rms enter, which raises
￿ again. This will go on until no more ￿rms exit and ￿ > 1. We therefore
have to make a very clear distinction between the short run where ￿ < 1 is
possible;5 and long run equilibria where, as a result of restructuring and/or
market entry, it is not. We impose that distinction from now on.
3.2 Short run general equilibrium relations
Since in a symmetric equilibrium all producers need to charge the same price,
and since not all of them can have relative prices larger then one in a general
equilibrium, all relative prices must be equal to one in a general equilibrium
setting. Substituting that into (11) provides us with the following condition
for the reservation wage
wr(u) =
1
1 + ￿
(15)
Taking tax rates as temporarily ￿xed, this expression implicitly determines
short run unemployment rate which is the consequence of the assumed ￿xed
short run coe¢ cient of the elasticity of substitution. Substituting (15) into
(12) we obtain a solution for the short run general equilibrium real wage
5￿ = 1 implies Cobb-Douglas consumption preferences, ￿ = 0 Leontie⁄ ￿xed propor-
tions consumption. However, ￿ < 1 implies ￿ ￿ 1which implies a notional reservation
wage that is zero or negative if relative prices are to remain nonegative. We interpret
that as a strictly temporary reduction in leisure time by ￿rm i￿ s work force; or as social
support, or wage subsidies, o⁄ered to those who agree to remain in work ￿as happened
during the German reuni￿cation episode for example.
10given by:
wi
P
=
1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ tw) ￿ ￿(tw + tp) + tp
(1 + tp)(1 ￿ tw)(1 + ￿)
(16)
3.3 Comparative Statics for the Short Run Equilibrium
Proposition 1 Short run real wages are an increasing function of labour￿ s
bargaining power if and only if mark-up, broadly de￿ned, is greater than the
share of the total tax burden on the per unit net wage received by employ-
ees: or, equivalently, if the following condition (market distortions exist) is
satis￿ed when ￿ > 1:
￿ >
tw + tp
1 ￿ tw
(17)
Proof. The ￿rst derivative of short run equilibrium real wage is positive if
(17) holds since
@ wi
P
@￿
=
￿(1 ￿ tw) ￿ tp ￿ tw
(1 ￿ tw)(1 + tp)(1 + ￿)
(18)
when ￿ > 1 (so that ￿ > 0). And the result still holds if ￿ < 1, since ￿ < ￿1
when 0 < ￿ ￿ 1.
In contrast to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) who claim that short run
equilibrium real wages are always an increasing function of bargaining power,
we ￿nd that this result actually depends on the relationship between the
existing tax rates in the economy and the value of mark-up (i.e. on the
impact of market power vs. the e⁄ects of distortionary taxation). If the tax
system is such that the value of the broadly de￿ned mark-up is larger than
the share of the government￿ s total tax receipts in the net wage received by
employees, then the Blanchard and Giavazzi conclusion does hold. If not,
their conclusion does not hold.
On the other hand, taking the ￿rst derivative of the short run equilibrium
real wage with respect to that mark-up, shows that short run real wage
is always a decreasing function of the mark-up and hence an increasing
function of the degree of substitution in the product markets.6 This result
was obtained by Blanchard and Giavazzi as well. It is consequence of two
opposite e⁄ects. The ￿rst is a partial equilibrium e⁄ect, in which an increase
in the mark-up leads to higher rents to the ￿rms. That in turn, leads to an
increase in the worker￿ s nominal wage since they receive a share (￿) of the
rents. The second is a general equilibrium e⁄ect channelled through prices.
An increase in the mark-up leads to an increase in prices which represents
6Where the derivative is given by
@
Wi
P
@￿ = ￿
1￿￿
(1+￿)2(1￿tw) which is always less the zero
since both ￿ and tw are positive but less then one.
11a loss to the workers since they can buy less of a more expensive product.
Since the magnitude of the latter e⁄ect is greater than the former, the real
wage received by labour falls.
Next we consider the consequences of a change in the two types of taxes
on short run real wages and on the reservation wage. They are summarized
in the following two propositions.
Proposition 2 The short run equilibrium real wage is always a strictly de-
creasing function of payroll taxes, whereas it is una⁄ected by changes in wage
taxes.
Proof. Substitute the broad de￿nition of mark-up into the solution for
the short run equilibrium real wages, and take ￿rst order derivatives with
respect to tp and tw.
The intuition behind this conclusion comes from the e⁄ect of tax changes
on the mark-up. Evidently the mark-up is less responsive to changes in the
payroll tax than it is to changes in taxes paid on wages (note 4, 0 ￿ tw <
1). Thus in the case of an increase in payroll taxes, real wages must fall
because ￿rms can always increase their mark-up by enough to more than
compensate for the increase in the payroll tax (see again note 4). Their
burden is therefore partly transferred to the workers. But if there is an
increase in wage taxes, workers will demand higher wages. However, ￿rms
are able to compensate this increase by raising their mark-up by even more
than they could in the case of a payroll tax. That then results in an increase
in the general price level which compensates for the wage increase such that
real wages remain una⁄ected.
Proposition 3 The short run equilibrium reservation wage is always a strictly
decreasing function of both types of taxes.
Proof. (14) and (15) together imply the result.
This result is also intuitive since the equilibrium reservation wage is in-
versely related to the mark-up, and the mark-up is increasing in both types
of taxes. Proposition 3 therefore implies that the equilibrium unemployment
rate will increase with increases in both types of taxes, which is something
to be expected. But it is important to note that the size of the e⁄ect on
the reservation wage, and hence the unemployment rate, di⁄ers depend-
ing on which tax rate has been changed. More precisely, a change in the
tax on wages (paid by employees) has larger e⁄ect on the equilibrium un-
employment rate than a change in the payroll taxes (paid by employers).
One possible explanation lies in the fact that real wages are not a⁄ected
by changes in the wage tax paid by employees. But if real wages do not
change, and yet taxes have increased, this change must be accommodated
12through a reduction in total demand for the product and hence in employ-
ment. This then implies that e⁄ect of change in the taxes will be partially
o⁄set by the change in the mark-up, and partially by an increase in un-
employment. The same will happen with changes to payroll taxes, but the
e⁄ect on unemployment (and the reservation wage) will be larger because
the change in mark-ups will be smaller. This is an important result for the
policy implications discussed in section 5.7
4 Long run equilibrium relations
4.1 Entry and Exit
The key change here, as we noted above, is that ￿rms can now restructure
and enter new markets. We assume that ￿rms need to pay a ￿xed entry cost
which is a proportion of (the price of) their output. This means that ￿rms
will enter the market as long as rents cover those entry costs. Since ￿rms
get share of (1 ￿ ￿) of total rents from which taxes need to be paid, we can
de￿ne the share of net rents available to cover entry cost in the following
way
(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ (1 + tp)wr(u)] (19)
Using (15) we can now express the maximum acceptable entry cost as a
function of the mark-up, bargaining power and taxes. It is given by
c = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿ tp
1 + ￿
￿
(20)
However the mark-up itself is no longer exogenous since the elasticity of
substitution coe¢ cient will change as the number of ￿rms, and hence the
number and varieties of goods, will change as ￿rms enter and exit the mar-
ket. As we saw in section 3, the number of ￿rms, and hence the degree of
substitution between goods, will adjust endogenously (and probably rise)
through restructuring, entry and exit until the rents generated, (19), are
fully consumed by the entry costs (20). In other words the number of ￿rms
and thereby the degree of competition must be such as to totally dissipate
any excess pro￿ts/rents over entry cost. Recall that this implies ￿ ￿ 1, since
otherwise there are no pro￿ts to be dissipated and no ￿rms that survive in
the long run. This yields:
Proposition 4 The number of ￿rms, goods and employment will eventually
rise if tax rates of either type are increased; or if market regulation measures
lower the degree of substitutability (the degree of competition) between goods
or producers.
7The intuition provided for propositions 2 and 3 here, assumes ￿ > 1. If ￿ < 1, the
same arguments apply but the directions of change will be reversed.
13Proof. The ￿rst derivative of the maximum acceptable entry cost is positive
if ￿ > 1,
@c
@￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + tp)
(1 + ￿)2 (21)
Combining (21) with (14), or with
@￿
@￿ < 0 from (13), gives the result.
Remark It is important to see what is going on here since proposition
4 appears counterintuitive. But increasing tax rates of either type increases
the mark-up that ￿rms can impose, and hence the costs (and rents) they
are prepared to pay to enter the market. Moreover, that mark-up will have
increased by more than the increase in tax rates: see note 4. To achieve
this, the number of ￿rms (degree of competition) has to fall in the short
term although pro￿ts and rents will have risen. That￿ s what (21) says. But
if rents and entry costs rise, new ￿rms will enter the market and, in the
longer term, the number of ￿rms, goods and employment will rise again.
That is what (21) then implies. Hence proposition 4. Increasing the amount
of regulation in the product markets will produce the same result if entry
remains free.
Corollary 1 More ￿rms (goods, employment) enter the market in the long
term than leave in the short term.
Proof. The short term mark-up is implied by (14), and the subsequent
(long term) adjustments by the partial derivatives from (21), (23) below
and then (13) once the new degree of substitutability has been established.
Putting these together, the total change is
d￿ =
￿
1 +
@￿
@￿
@￿
@c
@c
@￿
￿
￿jdj where j = tw;tp;￿ (22)
where the second term in brackets represents long term changes. But, using
(21), (23) and (13), the square bracket is negative if ￿2twtp < 0. That
always holds, irrespective of ￿, so long as both taxes are present. Given
(14), that result con￿rms proposition 4.
Comment The importance of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 is that
they show that a reduction in the number of ￿rms, for whatever reason, will
imply a return to equilibrium after rents and shadow entry costs rise. They
also demonstrate formally that any reduction in the number of ￿rms caused
by ￿ < 1, will be followed by a rise in the number of ￿rms which continues
until ￿ > 1 (as claimed in section 3.1).
Corollary 2 A policy of reducing wage taxes will be more e⁄ective than
reducing payroll taxes for increasing the number of ￿rms, goods or employ-
ment. But a policy of market liberalisation (deregulation) that raises the
14level of competition between producers will be more e⁄ective than either at
low levels of competition, de￿ned as ￿(￿ ￿ 1) < 1 ￿ tw , but less e⁄ective if
competition (or taxation) are already strong.
Proof. Competition, and the number of goods and ￿rms all increase if the
allowable level of entry costs decreases. By (21), that requires the mark-up
￿ to rise. The result now follows by comparing the partial derivatives in
(14) with each other and with
@￿
@￿ < 0 from (13). Note that (21) implies
that the number of ￿rms increases with the entry costs (rents) they are
prepared to pay in order to enter a new market, and with the ease with
which their goods can substitute others (￿). Note also that employment
increases because
@wr(u)
@c < 0 follows from (24) below, so unemployment falls
overall (a larger number of ￿rms is not in itself su¢ cient).
Finally, by substituting (13) into (20) and rearranging we can solve for
the coe¢ cient of the substitution as an explicit function of the regulatory
parameters in the model. That solution is given by
￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp(1 ￿ tw) ￿ tw)
c(1 + tp) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)tw
(23)
Hence, using (23) and (13) in (15 ) and (16), we can solve for the long
run reservation wage and the long run real wage. Their equilibrium values
are now given by:
wr(u) =
1 ￿ c ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)
(24)
wi
P
=
1 ￿ c ￿ ￿tw
(1 + tp)(1 ￿ tw)
(25)
The introduction of taxation in this model has therefore increased the com-
plexity of the solution, but it is fairly straightforward to see the direction of
the e⁄ects of various regulatory parameters on the equilibrium reservation
and real wages.
4.2 Comparative Statics for the Long Run Equilibrium
We ￿rst consider the e⁄ect of the change in the bargaining power on the
reservation wage, and hence on the unemployment rate.
Proposition 5 Long run equilibrium reservation wage (unemployment rate)
is always an decreasing (increasing) function of labour￿ s bargaining power.
15Proof. The ￿rst derivative of wr(u) with respect to labour￿ s bargaining
power is given by
￿
c
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)
(26)
which is always negative.
Proposition 6 It is also easy to see that the long run equilibrium real wage
is always a decreasing function of bargaining power.
Proof. Taking ￿rst order derivatives in (25), we obtain ￿tw
(1+tp)(1￿tw) which
is always negative.
This result also di⁄ers from the standard result in the literature; as well
as from the result obtained by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) in which long
run equilibrium real wages are not a⁄ected by changes in bargaining power.
The question is why does the introduction of taxation into this economy
produce such di⁄erent predictions? In order to explain this result, consider
a permanent increase in labour￿ s bargaining power. In the short run, this
increase leads to an increase in real wages since the share of the pro￿ts going
to the workers will have increased. But that means the pro￿ts available to
￿rms will be reduced and it will be harder to satisfy requirement imposed
by the entry condition ￿the more so, the greater is ￿. Therefore the number
of the ￿rms present in the market will decrease. A decrease in the number
of ￿rms implies a decrease in the elasticity of substitution (demand) faced
by the remaining ￿rms. That means that ￿rms will be able to charge higher
prices. Even though workers will be demand higher wages to compensate
for that, it turns out that, because ￿rms have market power (and because
taxation increases the mark-up that this implies, and because the tax wedge
increases the nominal wage claim workers have to make to preserve their
take home pay), these wage increases will be magni￿ed in the price increase
that ￿rms are able to pass on. That leads to reduction in the real wage
￿nally received by the workers. If taxation were to go to zero, this e⁄ect
would vanish as (25) would be independent of ￿. Similarly, it would vanish
even in the presence of taxation if markets were to become fully competitive:
￿ ! 1 implies c t (1 ￿ ￿)tw in (23), which makes wi
P independent of ￿ in
(25). Hence either the presence of taxation, or imperfect competition, or
both, is responsible for this result.
Let us now consider the e⁄ects in the change of taxes on both reservation
and real wages.
Proposition 7 The long run reservation wage is not a⁄ected by changes in
the taxes paid by employees, but it is a decreasing function of the taxes paid
by employers. By contrast, the long run equilibrium wage is an increasing
function of the taxes paid by employees, and a decreasing function of the
taxes paid by employers.
16Proof. The ￿rst derivative of wr(u) with respect to tw is zero, and with
respect to tp is
￿
1 ￿ c ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)2 (27)
which is negative as long as c + ￿ < 1. Similarly the ￿rst derivative of the
long run real wage with respect to tw is
1 ￿ c ￿ ￿
(1 + tp)(1 ￿ tw)2 (28)
whereas the ￿rst derivative with respect to tp is given by
￿
1 ￿ c ￿ ￿tw
(1 + tp)2(1 ￿ tw)
(29)
Of these two expressions, the ￿rst is always positive and the second always
negative so long as c + ￿ < 1. However, it is easy to check that c + ￿ < 1
always holds if ￿ > 1 (implying ￿ > 0) since tp > 0. That completes the
proof.
5 Some policy implications for market deregula-
tion
Based on the model predictions developed above, we can draw some im-
portant policy implications. Consider ￿rst a simple scenario in which the
government wants to decrease the taxes paid by the employers. Let us also
assume that the government either wants to keep the budget balanced, or
needs to keep it within some strict upper bound such as the 3% of GDP
limit imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. In order to satisfy those
requirements and conditional on the fact that government has only two in-
struments available in this model, what are the short and long run e⁄ects
of this policy? Are reform measures of this kind really more e⁄ective for
growth and employment than a simple reduction in wage taxes?
To answer these questions, we present three examples which draw on
and extend the short term-long term results in sections 3 and 4. They are
designed to highlight the three main areas for structural reform: lowering the
burden of ￿scal policy, deregulation in the labour markets, and liberalisation
in the product markets.
A): According to Proposition 2, the short run increase in the taxes paid
by employees needed to keep the budget in balance will not a⁄ect real wages,
whereas the planned reduction in payroll taxes would lead to an increase in
the real wage through its positive e⁄ect on the mark-up. But that increase
in taxes paid by employees would have the opposite e⁄ect on the mark-up,
17compared to a reduction in the payroll tax. Moreover, in the short run, it
would lead to a decrease in employment since the negative wage tax e⁄ect
will be larger than the positive payroll tax e⁄ect. The overall impact of this
type of policy would therefore be to increase unemployment in the short
term. It might have been better to have just reduced wage taxes; or simply
to have removed the requirement to keep the budget balanced. In any event,
there are signi￿cant disincentives which might prevent a structural reform
programme of this kind. It entails a short run loss in economic performance,
political loss of face, and a counter-productive outcome if budget balance is
enforced ￿while abandoning ￿scal restraint would have risked destabilising
the budget.
But in the long term, the sequence of events is quite di⁄erent. Indeed,
the direction of impact is reversed. By Proposition 7, the net long run e⁄ect
of an increase in the wage taxes needed to compensate for our reduction in
payroll taxes, would now lead to an increase in long run real wages; and
to a decrease in the unemployment rate (since the reservation wage, which
also increases, is negatively related to unemployment).8 The last statement
follows because the rise in wage taxes will not a⁄ect the reservation wage
(Proposition 7); but any compensating fall in payroll taxes will increase the
reservation wage, re￿ ecting a fall in unemployment, even if tw has had no
e⁄ect.
This example therefore con￿rms a quite widely accepted argument that
structural reforms (labour market deregulation, in this case) would be ben-
e￿cial from the long run perspective but would certainly induce short run
costs, both in terms of economic performance (indicated here by the increase
in the short run unemployment rate) and in its political implications. This
short run-long run con￿ ict is then made very much worse by the presence of
the budget restraint; and that in itself might be enough to block the reform
e⁄orts altogether. But the long term e⁄ects are entirely positive, for as long
as they last. The question therefore is whether the (discounted) long run
bene￿ts would outweigh the short run costs. To make that determination,
we need a model with more detailed dynamics than we have here.
B): Let us now consider another scenario, in which the government de-
cides on structural reform to reduce union bargaining power. In the short
run, this would lead to a reduction in the real wage received by workers,
but would have no e⁄ect on the unemployment rate (Proposition 1, where
wr(u) does not depend on ￿).9 This result is standard in the labour lit-
8This implication is consistent with Proposition 4, and its corollary, because the in-
crease in wage taxes has a larger e⁄ect in increasing the mark-up, and hence real wages
and the reservation wage, than the decrease in payroll taxes has in decreasing it. In other
words, there is a demand side e⁄ect despite the neutral budget changes. The distribution
of the burden of taxation therefore matters a great deal.
9Lower real wages here depends of course on (17) holding. In a competitive economy
(large ￿, low ￿), or one with high taxation, real wages would actually rise and produce
18erature, and implies some kind of trade-o⁄ between short run real wages
and the unemployment rate (a Phillips curve). In other words, in order to
keep unemployment rate unchanged real wages must fall to equilibrate the
markets. This is achieved because the larger share of the rents now goes to
￿rms, and the smaller portion of the rents going to the workers is a partial
determinant of real wages. Notice that the short run mark-up is una⁄ected
by this change in bargaining power.
But once again, the long run e⁄ects of such a change in bargaining power
run in the opposite direction. A long term reduction in labour￿ s bargaining
power leads to both an increase in real wages and a reduction in unemploy-
ment (see Propositions 5 and 6). Intuitively this is the consequence of the
adjustment in the elasticity of substitution (and hence mark-up) which takes
place in the long run. In fact, by (23) and then (13), the long run elasticity
of substitution is negatively related to this bargaining power as it reduces
the rents that ￿rms have available to pay entry costs. Hence the mark-up
is positively related to it. Consequently, a reduction in labour￿ s bargaining
power will lead to a fall in wages, an increase in the mark-up and hence
rents. That in turn will lead to an increase in the number of products (and
￿rms) in the market. From there we get an increase in employment and the
reservation wage. Moreover, since we have an increase in pro￿ts as a conse-
quence of the reduction in bargaining power, this policy will also lead to an
increase in the long run real wage. Thus, although the short run reduction
in real wages leads to reductions in demand and the supply of labour, it
increases the mark-up. That increase in the mark-up then translates into a
more than o⁄setting increase in demand as ￿rms restructure and/or enter
the market, with the result that employment and real wages increase in the
long run and restore the labour supply.
C): Both scenarios so far have been concerned with reforms in the labour
market. Our third example highlights the scope for reforms in the product
markets. Suppose the government now engages in a programme of mar-
ket liberalisation and deregulation. Whatever the speci￿cs of the measures
pursued, the end result must be an increase in the degree of competition
between ￿rms and substitutability between goods: ￿ rises. However, as the
model makes clear, that takes time. Structural reform cannot create new
￿rms or new products, and hence more competitive markets directly ￿it
can only create the conditions under which they operate. Consequently,
the elasticity of substitution and mark-up (along with everything else) will
remain constant in the short run in this example. But in the long run, ￿
will rise as ￿rms adjust to (enter) the newly deregulated markets ￿raising
the number of goods, ￿rms and employment (Proposition 4). And the ef-
outcomes more in line with the long run results cited in the next paragraph (but in
the short term of course). The barrier to reform here is therefore market power by the
producers or unions, not distortionary taxation.
19fect will be bigger than in our other two examples if competition has been
low in the past, or taxation high. In that sense, a programme of market
liberalisation measures may represent a more important option. However,
(13) and (21) imply
@￿
@￿ < 0 and @c
@￿ > 0. Hence the expressions at (24) and
(25) imply that real wages will rise. But the reservation wage will also rise,
and hence unemployment fall, as the implicit rents to labour begin to fall in
this more competitive environment. That holds unless taxes of either kind
are reduced, or labour￿ s bargaining power is increased at the same time: as
in examples A or B. Structural reforms in the labour market and product
markets are therefore interdependent, and need to be treated as such.
6 Conclusions and Lessons
We have taken a well known model of the labour market in an economy with
imperfect competition in both the product and labour markets. Prices are
set by the interaction of supply and demand, while wages are determined by
bargaining. Both labour and ￿rms derive rents from their market positions.
Firms can therefore enter or exit these markets. We de￿ne the short run
as too short for this to happen, and the long run the equilibrium after that
process is complete.
On this structure we impose distortionary taxes, taxes on wages and
payroll or other corporate taxes. We also allow for changes in trade union
(wage bargaining) power and for the possibility of market liberalisation in
the product/services markets. From the equilibrium outcomes of this model,
we ￿nd:
a) There is a great di⁄erence between the short run and long run results
of structural reform measures. The short run e⁄ects involve signi￿cant costs
and losses in performance, but the long run e⁄ects are almost uniformly
favourable. Structural reform programmes are therefore very likely to be
avoided, or abandoned if undertaken, because of their short run costs.
b) Fiscal restraint, and ￿scal discipline such as imposed by Europe￿ s
Stability Pact, exaggerate this e⁄ect and make it even less likely that reforms
will be carried out. But to ignore those restraints is to risk destabilising the
budget. There is a trade-o⁄ here.
c) The type of reform matters. Reducing wage taxes has a bigger impact
than reducing payroll taxes. This is a policy which is claimed by many
social democrat parties, and it runs counter to the results in Hughes Hallett
et al (2005), evidently because there is no cost side to the reasoning that
underlies the results. In this model, we can only account for the demand
and market structure e⁄ects of the reform package.
d) Nevertheless, the advantage of using wage taxes vanishes if markets
become fully competitive (￿ ! 1) or union bargaining power becomes too
large (￿ ! 1). In all other circumstances, the distribution of the burden of
20taxation and adjustment matters.
e) Pro-competition liberalisation of the markets is likely to be more ef-
fective than tax reform if the level of competition is very low or taxes are
high, but less useful if the competition is already signi￿cant.
f) Excessive union power (￿ ! 1) will mean no reforms are possible since
the long term gains vanish (c ! 0) and we are left with the case where short
run costs dominate.
g) Product and labour market reforms are interdependent, and need to
be conducted jointly. They can be done alone, but are seldom e⁄ective: in
particular market liberalisation measures without deregulation in the labour
markets.
The next steps in this research will be to model the dynamics of the re-
form process explicitly, to give an idea when the short run costs are likely to
appear to outweigh the long run bene￿ts, whether fast or slow reform pro-
grammes would be preferable, and whether ￿scal restraints would actually
stop reforms in their early stages. Second, we need some empirical analysis,
to show which countries are most in need of reform and whether it should
be tax reform, labour market deregulation, or market liberalisation.
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23Appendix: Generalizing to a standard pro-
duction function
In this appendix, we rework all the results of this paper using a fully speci￿ed
(Cobb-Douglas) production function in place of the simple linear production
function at (5). This will allow the elasticity of the demand for labour, and
hence capital under the assumption of constant returns to scale to vary and
to play a role.
We ￿nd that all our results are unchanged, except in so far as the math-
ematical expressions are inevitably more complicated and less illuminating.
Consequently, propositions 1 to 7 continue to hold as before with the ex-
ception of minor restrictions on the conditions which have to be met for
Proposition 6 still to hold as it stands (the long run impact of labour￿ s bar-
gaining power on real wages); and for one part of Proposition 7 (the long run
impact of business taxes on the reservation wage). The sign of these e⁄ects
could, under certain (unlikely) combinations of the elasticity and wage tax
parameters, become reversed. But those two variations aside, all the results
of the main text go through intact. Our results are therefore robust to the
simple production function given by (5).10
Suppose we replace (5) with the Cobb-Douglas production function given
by Yi = N￿
i K1￿￿
i , and normalize the capital stock to unity as before. This
implies that equations (5) and (6) of the main text will be replaced by
Yi = N￿
i and Ni =
￿
Yi
m
￿ 1
￿ ￿
Pi
P
￿￿ ￿
￿
(A1)
respectively, where 0 < ￿ < 1 denotes the elasticity of demand for labour
and ￿ is as before. In that case, the bargaining problem between ￿rms and
workers becomes, instead of (8),
max
Pi;wi
(
￿ log
"
(1 ￿ tw)wi ￿ PA]
￿
Y
m
￿ 1
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￿ ￿￿
￿
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m
￿
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￿￿￿
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Y
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￿ 1
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￿
#)
(A2)
Solving the two ￿rst order conditions, with respect to Pi and wi, for this
maximization, we get
10We do not go on to consider variations in the elasticity of substitution between labour
and capital here, since that is already implicit in the entry and exit of ￿rms and the
endogenous determination of the elasticity of substitution between goods. That might be
an exercise for later work.
24Pi
P
=
￿
￿(1 + tp)
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ tw)
￿ ￿
￿+￿(1￿￿) ￿
Y
m
￿ 1￿￿
￿+(￿￿￿)
wr(u)
￿
￿+￿(1￿￿)
(A3)
and
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to replace (9) and (10). That in turn implies that, in the short run, we will
have relative prices given by
Pi
P
=[1 + ￿]
￿
￿+￿(1￿￿)
￿
Y
m
￿ 1￿￿
￿+￿(1￿￿)
wr(u)
￿
￿+￿(1￿￿)
(A5)
and real wages by
wi
P
=
￿
1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ tw) ￿ ￿(tw + tp) + tp
(1 + tp)(1 ￿ tw)
￿
wr(u) (A6)
where ￿ is still the mark-up. The mark-up itself now equals
￿ =
￿(1 + tp ￿ ￿ + ￿tw)
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ tw)
+
1
(￿ ￿ 1)
(A7)
Notice that (A5), (A6) and (A7) all revert to their original expressions if
￿ = 1. Similarly, notice that the signs of the partial derivatives in (14) also
continue to hold:
@￿
@tp
=
￿
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ tw)
> 0 (A8)
and
@￿
@tw
=
￿(1 + tp)
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ tw)2 > 0 (A9)
From here we can deduce that, in the short run equilibrium, the reser-
vation wage and the real wage will be given by
wr(u) =
1
1 + ￿
￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A10)
and
wi
P
=
￿
1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ tw) ￿ ￿(tw + tp) + tp
(1 + tp)(1 ￿ tw)(1 + ￿)
￿￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A11)
25Now we turn to the long run equilibrium. Proceeding as in the main
text, equations (19), (20) and hence (21) will be unchanged. In addition ￿
will continue to be given by (A7) once ￿ has been determined. Using these
relations, we can eliminate ￿ to obtain
￿ =
￿(1 ￿ tw)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)
c(1 + tp) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ tw)(1 + tp)
(A12)
to replace (23). Hence, in the long run we obtain
wr(u) =
￿((1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)tw ￿ c)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)
￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A13)
as equilibrium reservation and real wages in the long run.
From here we can determine the comparative static terms which we need
to derive new versions of propositions 1 to 7 for this case. We have
@wr(u)
@￿
= ￿
c￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)
￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A14)
which is always negative (positive for the unemployment rate). Hence
Proposition 5 holds unchanged. We also have
@ wi
P
@￿
=
￿
(1 ￿ tw)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ tw)(1 + tp)
￿￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A15)
in place of the expression in Proposition 6 of the main text, which is always
negative so long as
(1 ￿ ￿)2
(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿
< tw < 1 (A16)
Hence Proposition 6 also holds as long as tw is bounded away from zero,
which it almost certainly will be. Indeed (A16) is almost certain to hold for
any plausible wage tax rate since ￿ > 2
3 is the estimate typically obtained
for the elasticity of labour demand in (A1).
Moving on to Proposition 7, we have the following partial derivatives
@ wi
P
@tw
=
￿(1 ￿ c ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ tw)2(1 + tp)
￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A17)
which is always positive as long as c+￿ < 1, just as in expression (28) which
it replaces. Likewise
@wr(u)
@tw
= ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
(1 + tp)
￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A18)
26which is now negative in all circumstances, instead of zero in the version
of Proposition 7 it replaces. Example A of section 5 would need to be
adjusted to that extent (but with no implications for the overall outcome).
Finally, (27) will now be replaced by
@wr(u)
@tp
= ￿
￿((1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)tw) ￿ c)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + tp)2 (A19)
and
@ wi
P
@tp
= ￿
￿(2 ￿ c ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿ ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)tw
(1 ￿ tw)(1 + tp)2
￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A20)
These two expressions are negative as in the original Proposition 7 if the
following inequalities hold:
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)tw >
c
(1 ￿ ￿)
(A21)
and
￿(2 ￿ c ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
> tw (A22)
These results allow us to complete the remaining propositions. Taking
the short run equilibrium results (A7), (A10) and (A11), we have the partial
derivatives (A8) and (A9) plus
@ wi
P
@￿
=
￿
￿(1 ￿ tw) ￿ tw ￿ tp
(1 ￿ tw)(1 + tp)(1 + ￿)
￿￿
Yi
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
(A23)
which remains positive as before so long as (17) still holds. So Proposition
1 remains unchanged. For Proposition 2 we have
@ wi
P
@tw
= 0 (A24)
and
@ wi
P
@tp
= ￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿))
￿(1 + tp)
￿
Y
m
￿ ￿￿1
￿
< 0 (A25)
where the latter remains negative (as before) provided
￿￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ 1
> ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
(A26)
27But (A26) certainly holds if ￿ + ￿ > 1, which it will do since ￿ > 1 except
possibly in the short run while ￿rms restructure. Thus Proposition 2
is (almost) unchanged. Finally Proposition 3 is clearly unchanged since
it depends only on the signs of (A8), (A9) and (A10), which match (14)
and (15) of the main text. Proposition 3 remains intact therefore. And
Proposition 4 continues to hold because (21) of the main text remains
unchanged.
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